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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
CORRECTION 
to report by Mr NOE', Document 195/72 
1. The first paragraph of section 16 should read as follows: 
16. On 13 December 1960, because of the growing density of air traffic 
and the attendant risks, the Convention setting up th~ Eurocontrol 
Organization was concluded (coming into force on 1 March 1963) for 
the special task of coordinating air safety measures. Its members 
are seven countries of the enlarged Community1 for .E!2 members of 
the enlarged community (Italy and Denmark) only cooperation agree-
ments at present exist. Such agreements exist also with six other 
European countries. Specific arrangements are in force (covering, 
however, only North Atlantic traffic) with the USA. 
2. The map is replaced by the one shown on the reverse. 
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PE 30.248 
By lotter of 10 July 1970 the President of the European Parliament 
authorized the Transport Committee to draw up a report on 'European air trans-
port problems' • 
At the part-session of 3 July 1970 Mr Noe had already been appointed 
rapporteur with this in view. 
On 21 June 1972 the Commission of the Communities submitted the 'draft 
of a Council decision on the first measures of a common approach to air 
transport.' (Doc. COM (72) 695). 
By letter of 27 September 1972 the President of the Council of the 
European communities consulted the European Parliament on this Commission 
proposal. 
The President of the Council stated on this occasion that the decision 
to consult the European Parliament was without prejudice to any technical and 
procedural decisions that might prove necessary in the sphere covered by the 
Commission proposal. 
The President forwarded this proposal, which was printed and distributed 
as Working Document 134/72, to the Transport Committee. 
The draft report was examined at meetings held on 21 September, 
19 October and 11 December 1970, 22 January and 18 February 1971 and 26 June, 
18 September and 19 October 1972. 
The Commission proposal was examined at meetings held on 18 September 
and 19 October 1972. 
The Committee unanimously adopted the motion for a resolution and explan-
atory statement on 19 October 1972. 
The following were present: Mr Oele, Chairman, Mr Kollwelter, Vice-
Chairman, Mr Biaggi, Vice-Chairman, Mr Noe, rapporteur, Mr Bertrand, 
Mr Durieux, Mr Faller, Mr Giraud, Mr Kriedemann (deputizing for Mr Schwabe), 
Mr Meister and Mr Richarts. 
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The Transport Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament the 
following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the proposal of the Com-
mission to the Council on the first measures of a common approach to air 
transport 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the proposal from the Commission to the Council1 , 
- having been consulted by the Council (Doc. 134/72), 
- having regard to the report of the Transport Committee (Doc. 195/72), 
- whereas: 
(a) European air transport does not now measure up to all the requirements 
of the market; 
(b) the air lines are in economic difficulties which are due, inter alia,to 
the fact that technology is advancing by leaps and bounds so that often, 
because of keen competition, reasonable provision cannot be made for the 
depreciation of equipment, and to the absence of any capacity control; 
(c) it is to be feared that the growing deficits may fall on the shoulders 
of the taxpayer (particularly if a switch-over is made to supersonic air-
craft); 
1. Reaffirms the view it has already put forward a number of times that a 
common European air transport policy must be developed as an integral 
part of the common transport policy; 
2. Calls, therefore, upon the Council of the European Communities to carry 
out the tasks falling to it in the sphere of air transport and apply 
Article 84(2) of the EEC Treaty; 
3. Considers that the aim of a common air transport policy must be to create 
a more efficient European air service, which presupposes carrying exist-
ing agreements between air lines a stage further, improving not only 
technical but also operational and commercial cooperation and perform-
ance; 
1 OJ c 110, 18 October 1972 
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4. Is convinced that to achieve this aim Member States will have to round 
off the present system of bilateral agreements on landing rights with 
a general agreement within the Community framework; 
5. Trusts that an effort will shortly be made by the Governments, along the 
lines indicated in items 3 and 4, to achieve the essential minimum of 
rationalization in the technical, operational and commercial aspects of 
European air transport, particularly by forging ahead with the efforts 
already being made by the air lines in this field,· notably: 
(a) standardization of European air services and the necessary aircraft; 
(b) changing two-way air routes into circular ones, at the same time improv-
ing the flight scheduling system with the air of mathematic models; 
(c) laying down a European flight scheduling system embracing both inter-
national routes of air lines that operate outside Europe but make stop-
overs on European territory; and European and domestic air transport; 
(d) promoting the introduction of routes linking up regions on the borders 
of Member States by making more generous grants of landing rights of 
regional significance; 
(e) using a common system of capacity control, which should under certain 
conditions also cover charter flights, so as to safeguard the future of 
air line transport; 
6. Stresses that however the remedies proposed are applied they should not 
only serve to promote technical and operational efficiency but also 
largely contribute to giving passengers better and, if possible, 
cheaper service and to improving the economic position of air companies, 
particularly as regards scheduled services; 
7. Urges that an air traffic plan 'be drawn up at commun!t:, level pointing the 
way from the situation as it is today to an efficient organization of 
Europe's internal and external air links; 
8. Considers that even after the breakdown of the Air Union Project the re-
tention of the present number of air companies must not be made an ir-
reversible condition when assessing the scope for reorganization; 
9. Trusts that in furtherance of the aims referred to, advantage will be 
taken of the opportunities afforded by existing international organiza-
tions to make the necessary contacts with other European countries that 
are not in the Community; 
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10. Considers that the European States must adopt a conunon standpoint on 
safety and cooperate 
view to: 
more closely and in a more practical way with a 
(a) standardizing systems for the control of upper and lower airspace by 
making conunon use of Eurocontrol facilities; 
(b) bringing current efforts to prevent acts of sabotage and hijacking 
rapidly to a successful conclusion, particularly by giving effect to the 
international agreements signed in Tokyo in September 1963, at The Hague 
in December 1970 and in Montreal in September 1971; 
(c) bringing air transport steadily more and more into line with the needs 
of environmental protection, ensuring in the process, by harmonizing 
provisions at Conununity level, that the conditions of competition are 
not distorted; 
11. Calls also for a conunon approach by Member States within the Conununity 
towards 
(a) the harmonization of legal provisions affecting air transport; 
(b) the promotion of cooperation in research and development in the aircraft 
industry; 
(c) facilitating customs clearance at airports; 
(d) working out a conunon line on raternaking policy within existing inter-
national organizations, linking up raternaking policy with capacity policy; 
(e) working out conunon rules for charter flights; 
(f) working out a conunon policy on air transport infrastructures; 
12. Is firmly of the opinion that the European Parliament must be consulted 
regularly, in accordance with the spirit and letter of the EEC Treaty, on 
any measures that may be proposed by the Conunission and enacted by the 
Council of the European Conununities; 
13. ·Approves the Conunission proposal; 
14. Requests the Conunission, however, to incorporate the following amendments 
in its proposal, in accordance with Article 149(2) of the EEC Treaty; 
15. Requests its President to forward this resolution and the report 'of i~s 
conunittee to the Council and Conunission of the European Conununities. 
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Text proposed by the Commission of 
the European Communities1 
Amended text 
Decision of the Council on 
the first measures of a common approach to air transport 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Official English version of this text 
not available. 
1 For full text .see OJ c 110, 
18 October 1972 
having regard to the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Economic Com-
munity, particularly Article 84(2) 
and Article 235 - on a proposal 
from the Commission and after con-
sulting the European Parliament, 
WHEREAS: 
(a) To pave the way for a common 
air transport policy it proves 
necessary to lay down appropriate 
provisions to be made by the Com-
munity in the sphere of air trans-
port so as to improve the condi-
tions for the operation of air 
transport services within the 
framework of a general alignment; 
in the process special consider-
ation is to be given to what could be 
achieved through closer cooperation 
between Member States and their air 
transport companies at Community 
level. 
(b) unchanged. 
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HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS 
Article 1 
Official English version of this 
text not available. 
Article 1 
1. The Commission is instructed to 
check, jointly with governmental ex-
perts and representatives of the air 
companies appointed by each Member 
state, the air transport measures 
that should be taken at Community 
level with the following ends in 
view: 
- improving scheduled flight connec-
tions within the Community and .£.Q-
ordinatinq policy on the extension 
of air links between the Community 
and third countries; 
- coordinating the ratemaking policy 
of Member States; 
- deleted 
- harmonizing, where necessary, legal 
provisions affecting air transport: 
joint action to improve air safety: 
2. unchanged 
Article 2 unchanged 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
Chapter I - Introduction 
A) The EEC Treaty 
1. Article 84 of the EEC Treaty, which defines the scope of Title IV on the 
common transport policy, reads as follows: 
Article 84 
1 .. The provisions of this Title shall apply to transport by rail, 
road and inland waterway. 
2. The Council may, acting unanimously, decide whether, to what extent 
and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for 
sea and air transport. 
Although this Article places the main burden on the Council, it does 
not release the Commission from its share of responsibility under Article 
235: 
Article 235 
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in 
the course of the operation of the common market, one of the 
objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the 
necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take appropriate 
measures. 
The representative of the Commission informed the committee that the 
Commission's Legal Service had come to the conclusion that Article 235 is 
applicable only where the EEC Treaty contains no provisions covering a par-
ticular field. Hence Article 84 rules out application of Article 235. 
In a letter of 27 September 1972, in which he consulted the European 
Parliament on the Commission proposal, the President of the Council of 
Ministers, while avoiding reference to any legal basis for the consultation, 
did not describe it as 'optional'. 
The Committee would point out that while Article 84 provides no grounds 
either for the Commission's right to make proposals or for an obligation to 
consult the European Parliament, both would arise if Article 235 were ap-
- 10 - PE 30.248/fin. 
plied. The Commission's right to make proposals can in fact be regarded as 
a 'power' within the meaning of Article 235. 
It would at all events be an advantage if further legal inquiry were to 
establish that Article 235 can be applied. 
2. Moreover, the European Parliament has, on a number of occasions 
supported the view advanced by the Commission that the general provisions 
of the Treaty are applicable to the air transport sector because 
Article 84 only excludes air transport from the scope of Title r.v on 
transport. 
B) Earlier reports by the European Parliament 
3. The basic report of the European Parliament was drawn up in 1961 by 
Mr Corniglion-Molinier under the title 'The problem of air transport in the 
European Economic Community' (Doc. 107/61). On the basis of this report 
the European Parliament stressed, in a resolution, published in the Official 
Journal (No. 3, 17 January 1962) the absolute necessity of European co-
operation in air transport. 
4. In 1962, after consulting the Transport Committee, Mr Edoardo Martino 
drew up a report on behalf of Parliament's Internal Market Committee 'on a 
proposal for an EEC Council regulation extending application of Articles 85 
to 94 of the Treaty establishing the EEC to sea and air transport'. 
(Doc. 108/62) (See section C below). 
5. In 1965, the European Parliament againdelivenrl an opinion on air 
transport on the basis of a report by Mr Druot L'Hermine on 'The problems 
of integrating civil aviation in the Community' (Doc. 24/65). The 
resolution adopted by Parliament in connection with this report was 
published in the Official Journal (No. 95, 2 June 1965). 
This report can draw to a large extent on both the above-mentioned 
reports, which unfortunately met with little response from either Commission 
or Council. 
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C) The Commission's standpoint 
6. In 1960 the Commission submitted to the Council a memorandum on the 
interpretation and application of the Rome Treaty as regards sea and air 
1 transport. In this the Commission argued that the Community institutions 
had to take decisions, in the interests of the economy as a whole and to 
ensure a sound development of sea and air transport that would bring these 
two modes of transport within the scope of transport measures needed.to 
achieve the Treaty aims. The Commission adopted the same standpoint in its 
memorandum of 10 April 1961 on the basic lines of the common transport 
1 . 2 po icy. 
7. In its Action Programme of 1962 the Commission reaffirmed this_ 
standpoint but proposed no concrete.measures for air transport. It simply 
stated that it was investigating 'whether it is necessary to frame a 
. 3 
special regulation in the sphere of competition for air transport'. This 
investigation led before the end of 1962 to thejssue of Council Regulation 
No. 17 to transport (Official Journal No. 124, 28 November 1962), which 
remains applicable to air transport for an unlimited period. 
8. At the Council meeting of 20 October 1964, the Commission made a 
statement to the effect that_the complete establishment of the European 
Economic Community did not permit the exclusion from the integration process 
of two such important sectors as sea and air transport. The Commission 
referred to the efforts made both at international and at European level to 
ensure cooperation in aviation. In the Commission's view the current 
negotiations between the Governments of Member States on a common air 
transport policy within the Community should be pursued in the Community 
bodies themselves in accordance with the Treaty. Any arrangement made in 
the process should be underpinned by suitable provisions to be made by the 
council in application of Article 84 (2). All that the Commission achieved, 
however, was that the Council agreed to keep it regularly informed of the 
1 EEC Commission: 'The applicability of the rules of competition of the 
Treaty establishing the EEC to transport and the interpretation and 
application of the Treaty in so far as it affects sea and air transport'. 
(Memorandum of the Commission to the council) (Doc. VII/S/05230, Brussels, 
12 November 1960, sec. 29). 
2 EEC Cof!IIllission: 'Memorandum on the basic lines of the common transport 
policy', Brussels, 10 April 1961 (Doc. VII COM (61) SO, sec. 62). 
3 EEC Commission 'Action Programme for the conmen transport policy' 
(Commission statement to the Council) (Doc. VII/Com (62) 88, sec. 237, 
23 May 1962. 
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progress made by the negotiations then taking place on the Air Union 1 • 
Between then and 1970 the Commission made no comparable approaches to the 
Council. 
9. On the occasion of the applications for membership from the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway, the Commission noted, in the opinions 
it delivered to the council: 'On the other hand, it (the enlargement of the 
Community) would create a new situation for sea and air transport in view of 
the role they would play not only in trade between the enlarged Community 
and third countries but also in domestic trade 12 • 
10. At the council meeting of 4 June 1970, the Commission representative 
again referred to the urgent need for Community air transport measures and 
outlined the objectives. The Commission itself announced that it would 
shortly be submitting concrete and more detailed proposals on the measures 
which it considered most urgent3 • No such proposals have yet been submitted. 
The proposals of June 1972 (see below) were of a purely 'tactical' nature. 
In its Fifth General Report the Commission briefly refers to the 
possibility that enlargement of the Community might necessitate changes in 
the schedule for implementing the transport policy, and states that further 
measures, particularly in regard to sea transport, air transport and ports 
policy, will obviously be required4 • 
1 European Parliament, Working Document 50/65: 'Eighth General Report of 
the Commission of the European Economic Community on the activities of 
the Community (1 April 1964 to 31 March 1965) ', page 234, sec. 239. 
2 commission of the European Communities: 'Opinion delivered to the 
Council on the applications for membership of the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Denmark and Norway', l October 1969, p. 94, sec. 86. 
3 ECSC/EEC/Euratorn/Commission: 'Fourth General Report on the activities 
of the Communities 1970', Brussels-Luxembourg, February 1971, p. 253, 
sec. 302. 
4 ECSC/EEC/Euratorn/commission: 'Fifth General Report on the activities of 
the Communities 1971', Brussels-Luxembourg, February 1972, p. 344, 
sec. 396. 
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11. On 21 June 1972 the Commission adopted a 'draft Council (EEC) decision 
on initial steps towards common action in the sphere of air transport and 
submitted it to the council as an official proposal1 • 
This was not a detailed proposal from the Commission but, in the words 
of a Commission representative to your Committee, simply an attempt 'to open 
the door to Article 84 (2) '. It is examined more closely in Chapter V of 
this report. 
D) European cooperation on air transport outside the Community framework 
12. A common policy on air transport in the Community must obviously take 
existing European cooperation as its starting point. 
13. World-wide cooperation on air transport immediately after the war led 
to the founding of !CAO and IATA (see Sec. F Below) but the need for closer 
cooperation at European or Western European level then became apparent. 
14. The next step was taken by the Council of Europe which discussed various 
plans for cooperation on transport policy. These discussions eventually 
resulted in the establishment in 1963, of the European Conference of Ministers 
of Transport (ECMT), which, however, deals only with road, rail and inland 
waterway transport. It dealt with air transport, in the first thirteen years 
of its existence, only from the standpoint of its cooperation with surface 
transport. Finally, there were discussions on links between airports and 
road and rail networks and on long-term forecasts of demand in the passenger 
transport sector. Obviously the aim was merely to exchange views and 
experience and not to take any decisions. In recent years these questions 
have not been dealt with in any great detail in this context. 
15. Just as the CEMT, the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) derived 
its impetus from suggestions made by the council of Europe. The ECAC came 
into being in 1954/1955 and has since served as a sort of regional offshoot 
of the world-based !CAO. It has roughly the same membership as the Council 
of Europe. Its main accomplishment so far, apart from serving as a forum 
for exchanges of views and experience by the governments belonging to it, has 
been the conclusion of the multilateral agreement on the liberalization, 
among the ECAC member countries, of non-scheduled and charter flights. This 
agreement of 1956 (which came into force in 1959) was the starting point for 
the current upswing in charter flights which has put the air companies in 
difficulties. Many of them would now be happier if the agreement had never 
been thought of. (See IF and II B). 
1 European Parliament, Working Documents 1972 - 1973, Doc. 134/72, 
9 October 1972. 
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16. Because of the increasing density of air traffic and the dangers it has 
brought with it, the convention setting up Eurocontrol to coordinate air 
safety measures was signed on 13 December 1960. This came into force on 
1 March 1963. Eurocontrol's members include seven of the countries of the 
enlarged Communityi for another two of them (Italy and Denmark) only co-
operation agreements exist at present. There are similar agreements with 
five - more recently six - other European States. Arrangements also exist 
with the United States (involving, however, only North Atlantic traffic). 
Eurocontrol's task is to control upper airspace (above 7,500 m) and 
cooperate with military departments in the control of lower airspace (below 
7,500 m). It also deals with harmonization of air traffic regulations, 
standardization of equipment, and the common training of air safety 
personnel. 
Despite the useful and effective work Eurocontrol has done in individual 
cases, it has still not fulfilled the hopes pinned on it. 
The air companies complain that they are already being called upon to 
finance Eurocontrol without its having effectively replaced national air 
traffic control bodies, so that overall there has been an increase in costs. 
Eurocontrol cannot become really operational until 1976. The cooperation 
of national institutions is not yet satisfactory. 
17. The various cooperation agreements of individual air companies will be 
dealt with later in this report. The following section deals with the un-
successful project for an Air Union. 
E) Notes on the unsuccessful project for an Air Union 
18. The same idea and the same economic necessity that acted as a spur to 
European unification and the establishment of the Common Market prompted the 
question as to how to reduce the number of competing European air lines. 
Europe is too small to carry the large number of air lines existing at present. 
Taken on their own, the countries of Europe are too small, by air line stan-
dards, to provide an adequate market for an air line of the optimum size. 
The entire North American continent has no more than five air lines 
crossing the Atlantic on regular passenger services (National Airlines, PAA, 
'!WA, Air Canada and C.P. Air) whereas nearly all West European countries are 
jamming these routes with thirteen air companies (not to mention Aeroflot and 
five non-European companies) 1 • 
1 ~ee footnote to sec. 57 
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19. When discussions began in 1957 on the project to merge the Europeian air 
lines - initially under the name of Europair and later Air Union - the air 
companies were untler the necessity to assume the heavy financial burdens in-
volved in stepping out of the age of propeller-driven aircraft to the age of 
jets. 
The negotiations went on too long and broke down at a time (1965) when 
all the companies had made the conversion. 
20. It was a sad day in the history of European unification when the Council 
of Ministers of the Community declined to involve the Community in thr~ neg-
otiations, although the air line circles that wanted to cooperate in the Air 
Union coincided exactly with those of Community Member States after Kr,M, which 
had temporarily left the negotiating table, had returned and after Luxembourg 
had, in Luxair, acquired an official air line. By the time the Commission 
had bullied the council into making the concession, at the end of 1964, that 
it should at least be informed about government negotiations on.Air Union, 
there was no longer much to report apart from the suspension of negotiations 
and the collapse of the project in May 1965. 
21. The Air Union project would have afforded an opportunity of working out 
a common European air transport policy. It could have been the starting 
point for a joint decision on landing rights in Community countries. Such a 
common air transport market would not only have obviated a good deal of un-
necessary competition between European air lines but would also have greatly 
strengthened the negotiating position in relation to third countries. The 
result would have been a far-reaching rationalization of operations and an 
improvement in services, above all an improvement in the financial position 
of air companies. 
22. Why did the project fall through? The six air lines involved had agreed 
on the text of a treaty which was submitted to the Governments. Agreement 
between the Governments foundered on three points: 
- the French Government did not want the right of supervision over Air Union 
to be transferred to an inter-governmental ministerial committee: 
- the other Governments were not prepared to fall in with French wishes that 
the Air Union should rely mainly on a common stock of aircraft (esfecially 
the Caravelle). Lufthansa had at that time just decided, in the interests 
of the uniformity of its air fleet, to use only Boeings for all classes of 
aircraft: 
- no agreement was reached on the quotas that would be assigned under Air 
Union to individual member countries. 
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23. It may be supposed that these questions could have been settled if the 
Air Union project had formed part of a common air transport policy under 
Article 84 (2). This assumption is borne out by the fact that the air lines 
themselves had already agreed on the text of a treaty. At the negotiations 
between the Governments, however, the Commission was not present to represent 
the Community's interests. 
24. Following the breakdown of the Air Union project - and there appears to 
be not the slightest chance of its being resurrected - it is very hard to put 
forward new proposals for a European air transport policy. 
Probably all that can now be done is to put forward separate proposals on 
each of the individual problems which Air Union would have solved as a whole, 
with a view to ensuring, on the part of ·the national authorities, joint ad-
ministration of landing rights, and, as far as the airlines are concerned, 
ever-increasing technical and operational cooperation and the promotion of 
economic cooperation in individual sectors. 
F) Compatibility of a common air transport policy with existing inter-
national agreements 
25. Since the end of the Second World War almost all the countries of the 
world have been cooperating as members of the International civil Aviation 
Organisation. An independent agency of the United Nations, !CAO has done 
extremely useful work since it was set up nearly thirty years ago and can 
claim much of the credit for the boom in continental and oceanic air trans-
port throughout the world. Among other things the organisation has establis-
hed rules for international cooperation, promoted better legislation and in-
troduced meteorological services. 
The Soviet Union recently became a member, thus confirming ICAO's success 
and enchancing its status as a world organisation. As at 30 June 1972 the 
Organisation had 124 member countries. 
26. These countries deal jointly with all matters requir~ng a decision at 
government level; IATA, on the other hand is a non-government organisation 
which was set up to improve cooperation between the airlines. Its members 
comprise almost all the world's airlines providing scheduled services, 
regardless of their legal status. 
IATA's objectives are to facilitate international air traffic and in 
particular to promote standardisation in a wide range of fields through 
cooperation between the airlines for the benefit of passengers. IATA is not 
simply concerned with problems of rates and tickets but also with a variety of 
technical matters (standardisation of aircraft equipment and ground 
facilities, airport questions, etc.) and with flight safety (rules of 
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navigation, transport of dangerous goods, etc.). A standing committ~e on 
environmental protection was also set up recently. The Organisation also 
acts as a clearing-house, making it much easier to settle accounts between 
airlines and with a network of over 17,000 approved travel agencies it helps 
to simplify air travel for passengers throughout the world. In all matters 
that require government decisions and hence cannot be settled by the airlines 
themselves, IATA cooperates closely with ICAO, being represented, for example, 
on the latter's legal committee. 
IATA's main achievement has been to prevent price wars between airlines. 
Although all tariffs must be approved by the various governments concerned, 
the Organisation has exerted a major influence on prices. Even if, as at 
the present time, negotiations within the organisation have occasionally 
led to clashes of·interest, the system on the whole operates satisfactorily. 
27. Given the achievements of those world-wide organisations, it is some-
times asked whether a-common European air transport policy would not be a 
retrograde step. Air transport, so the argument runs, has world-wide im-
plications that leave no scope for European action. The immediate rejoinder 
is that hardly any sector of the economy today is without equally far-reach-
ing implications throughout the world. Neither the cereals sector, say, nor 
the clock industry can be viewed nowadays in purely continental terms. But 
the main point is that world-wide cooperation - which must necessarily be 
loose in form - does not rule out closer co-operation on a continental scale. 
28. It is hardly surprising that world organisations view the establishment 
of continental - or regional - organisations with some suspicion as ICAO did 
when ECAC was founded. In the final analysis, however, it is to the advan-
tage of world organisations when important regions join forces and speak 
with one voice. 
29. The committee feels that a common Community air transport policy would 
not only not be in contradiction with existing international agreements but 
might well improve international cooperation. This holds just as true for 
world organisations as it does for ECAC whose objectives would be brought 
much more speedily within reach if the Community Member States could agree on 
a common air transport policy. 
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Chapter II - The present air transport situation in Europe 
30. It is not intended here to give a comprehensive account of the air 
transport situation in Europe but simply to make a few comments in support 
of the proposals put forward for Community action. 
A) The structure of the European airlines 
31. The major airlines in the Community countries can all be considered as 
state enterprises although the Government share capital holdings vary con-
siderably: 
Government shareholding in the airlines1 
Airline Government shareholding 
ALITALIA 96.2 
SABENA 90.0 
LUFTHANSA 73.0 
KLM 72.0 
AIR FRANCE 70.0 
LUXAIR 43.0 
Luxair is the only airline in which the state has a minority holding 
while the French UTA and the British BUA are entirely in private ownership. 
The federal German Railways and Post Office are large shareholders in 
Lufthansa while in Italy, the entire state holding is administered by the 
IRI. In both Germany and Italy the state holding is thus dispersed to some 
extent,whereas in the new Member countries where the figure is 100%, it is 
directly administered by the government (Aer Lingus Aer Linte, BOAC, BEA, 
SAS). Large private shareholders in the various airlines include banks, 
shipping companies, car manufacturers, steel producers and insurance com-
panies. 
In addition to the large airlines that are owned or part-owned by the 
state, there are a good many private charter companies.· W}lereas the air-
lines must comply with a wide range of binding regulations, the charter 
companies enjoy the advantage of far more liberal rules of operation. One 
or two airlines, moreover, have acquired a capital interest in charter com-
panies (see 37 below). 
1 Source: Commission of the European Communities and IATA. 
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32. The large European airlines pursue widely divergent equipment policies. 
Taking as an example the operation of jets of different manufacture as at 
1 January 1970, Lufthansa and I<LM had gone furthest in applying the principle 
of a homogeneous fleet: Lufthansa confined itself to various types of 
Boeings (67 aircraft) and I<LM to Douglas (47 aircraft). The fleets of the 
other airlines showed greater variety: Air France operated 52 Bo~ings and 
42 Caravelles, Sabena 17 Boeings and 10 Caravelles, Alitalia 2 Boeings, 
1 55 Douglas and 18 Caravelles. The fact that I<LM and Lufthansa opted for 
the principle of a homogeneous fleet and thus did not purchase the caravelle2 
was undoubtedly one of the reasons for the failure of the Air Union project. 
33. The large airlines of the Conununity employ the following staff: 
Staff employed by state-owned airlines3 
Airline Total 
31.12. 68 
AIR FRANCE 26 800 
DLH 18 300 
I<LM 14 OOO 
ALITALIA 11 100 
SABENA 10 OOO 
Staff 
31.12. 70 
27 600 
22 OOO 
15 800 
14 100 
10 600 
31.12.71 
28 100 
22 800 
16 600 
14 400 
10 500 
34. With the capital, equipment and personnel described above, the air-
lines provide the following scheduled national and international services: 
1 Figures from IATA's 'World Air Transport Statistics' Nos. 15 and 16, 
Geneva-Montreal 1970 and 1971. (Not including leased aircraft) 
2 A further factor behind their decision was that no plans had been made 
for the subsequent development of the Caravelle. 
3 Source: Statistical Office of the Conununities, IATA (to the nearest 100). 
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Scheduled services provided by the airlines1 
Airline Length of route network Overall operating Passenger load 
covered by scheduled results (Passengers, factor (utili-
services at the end luggage and freight) sation rate) 
of the year (in km) in '000 t/km a percentage 
1970 1971 1970 1971 1970 1971 
Air France 415 OOO 425 OOO 1 321 1 361 53.5 53.4 
Lufthansa 359 OOO 389 OOO 1 284 1 365 55.1 54.4 
Alitalia 308 OOO 328 OOO 992 1 082 52.2 51.1 
KLM 296 OOO 328 OOO 913 1 009 51.2 51.2 
SABENA 156 OOO 179 OOO 405 456 50.4 54.4 
35. The regional spread of air traffic in the Conununity countries is best 
seen from the statistics of the various airports which are given in graph 
form in an appendix. 
B) The development of charter transport 
as 
36. The most striking change in the pattern of air transport in Europe over 
the last few years has been the boom in charter services. Although some of 
the large airlines also provide these, they are tightly bound by a resolution 
which they themselves approved in IATA to protect scheduled services against 
charter traffic. 
Non-scheduled services provided by Air France, Alitalia and Lufthansa 
represent less than 5% of their scheduled traffic. The figure for Sahena is 
between 5% and 10% while KLM is the only airline to exceed the 10% mark. 
37. Several airlines have acquired an interest in or in some cases the 
entire share capital of charter companies. Details are given in the 
following table: 
1 Source: IATA op. cit. 
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Airline 
Lufthansa· 
KLM 
Alitalia 
Air France 
SABENA 
Total 
1 Source: 
Charter subsidiaries of state 
airlines in the Conununity countries1 
Subsidiary Share capital Number 
holding 
1969 
(%) 
Condor 100 786 
Martinair 25 440 
Societa Aerea 95 360 
Mediterranea 
Air Charter 100 336 
International 
Sobelair 100 110 
2,032 
IATA and ACCA. 
of passengers 
1971 
(' OOO) 
1,200 
503 
300 
456 
150 
2,609 
The above subsidiaries, however, accounted for no more than about 17% 
of total international operations in 1969 by charter companies established 
in Europe and the current figure is probably not much higher. 
38. As already mentioned, European charter transport has been fully 
liberalised as a result of an agreement concluded on 30 April 1956 in 
ECAC ('Multilateral agreement on non-scheduled services') and there are 
a good many small to fairly large private charter companies in competition 
with the airlines and their subsidiaries. 
39. Some of these private companies enjoy special tax relief on equipment 
purchases. 
40. Companies licenced for charter transport are normally allowed to 
arrange group travel only. Unfortunately a group in this sense is 
extremely difficult to define. Furthermore, the definitions laid down 
by individual states and international organizations are easily bypassed 
and no checks are made to ensure that they are effectively applied. There 
is scope for Conununity action in this field. The conununity could also 
seek to promote a common approach to charter transport with third countries 
- 22 - PE 30. 248 
- the ECAC agreement is restricted to traffic in Europe. Charter transport 
agreements are still being negotiated on a bilateral basis, particularly 
with the United States1• 
41. Against this background the charter companies' share in North Atlantic 
traffic, to take one example, rose from a mere 2% in 1962 to an estimated 
22% in 1972 (not counting charter flights by IATA airlines). 2 If, as seems 
likely, this trend continues, private charter companies might well account 
for more than 5<>°fe of the traffic on the North Atlantic route by as early 
as 1974. 
42. This must clearly prompt certain conclusions in regard to IATA's rate-
making policy and the legal and licencing rules governing charter transport. 
C) A comparison with the u.s.A. 
43. comparison with the U.S.A. is extremely helpful in assessing the air 
transport situation in Europe. In very many respects the United States is 
far ahead of Europe in this field and achieves much higher performances. 
This is explained by a wide variety of factors some of which are 
immutable although others are susceptible to political influence. 
44. In 1970 the European Air Research Bureau (EARB) in Brussels produced 
an extremely interesting study based on figures for the late sixties from 
which the factual information contained in this section has been taken3• 
45. It is an inescapable fact that the 360,000,000 inhabitants of Western 
Europe are confined to an area of 4.4 million square kilometres while the 
territory of the United States with a population of 200,000,000 is more 
than twice as large covering 9.4 million square kilometres. In a larger 
country air transport naturally stands a better chance in competition 
against surface transport even with a smaller population. 
1 See written question No. 2062 from Mr Oele in the Dutch parliament 
(Second Chamber, 1971-72 Session, Annex p. 4145) and the Dutch government's 
reply. 
2 From information supplied by IATA. 
3 European Airlines Research Bureau: Comparative study of EARB and American 
airlines, 1970. 
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Furthermore, the advantages of a larger population are forfeited in 
Europe where the main centres of population are all concentrated in an area 
roughly bounded by the cities of London, Paris, Rome and Berlin, while in 
the United States, there are at least three widely separated population 
centres in the East, the West and the South. 
46. In the short term the standard of living in the United States, at 
approximately 4,000 dollars G.N.P. per capita, is also bound to remain con-
siderably higher than in Europe, where the figure is only 1,700 dollars. 
The inhabitants of a more prosperous country will naturally tend to travel 
more, using the most modern means of transport. 
47. The following facts, on the other hand, are determined by political 
considerations and are therefore amenable to change by political means: 
The total intra-European air traffic network runs to about 850,000 
kilometres as against approximately 500,000 kilometres in the United States. 
With this much smaller network the American airlines serve almost 1,100 
localities as against the European airlines' figure of approximately 750. 
The average distance between landings in Europe is 660 km but the figure 
in the United States, with its much larger area, is not much higher at 
800 km. The explanation for these remarkable figures lies in the political 
structure of Europe. owing to the fragmentation of airspace, the European 
air transport network consists of repeated star-shaped patterns with too 
many direct flights and too few stopovers. 
The system of bilateral transport arrangements featuring too many two-
way instead of circular routes thus places the European airlines at a dis-
advantage. 
The network structure is an inevitable consequence of the political 
system of bilateral landing rights. The airlines themselves can do nothing 
to change the situation which makes for lower cost-effectiveness. Any 
improvement must therefore come from government action at Conununity level. 
48. Partly owing to force of circumstance, partly as a result of factors 
amenable to political influence, traffic density in the United States is 
much higher - 5,700 departures per airport per year as against only 900 in 
Europe. 
49. The net result is that costs in Europe are very much higher - 0.27 
dollars per available ton/kilometer as against 0.14 dollars in the United 
States. With the longer route network and larger aircraft capacity, produc-
tivity in the u.s~A. is also far superior - approximately 7,900 available 
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t/km per aircraft and year as against only 4,500 t/km in Europe. 
A comparison of the productivity of labour shows Europe in a parti-
cµlarly unfavourable light: the European airlines produce no more than 
76,000 t/km per employee per year whereas the corresponding American 
figure is 186,000 t/km. 
50. Here again, many of the factors which make for poorer results in 
Europe cannot be influenced either by the airlines or even the governments. 
The EARB rightly points out that in other sectors of economic activity, 
productivity in the U.S.A. is also very much higher than in Europe. Closer 
examination shows, however, that productivity losses in Europe are largely 
explained by much steeper equipment maintenance costs; the size and 
homogeneityof aircraft fleets in the United States make for greater 
efficiency. 
In the late sixties the two largest fleets of a single type of aircraft 
in Europe were the 43 Caravelles operated by Air France and BEA' s 39 itf·, · •. 
Tridents. The two largest fleets of single type aircraft in America were 
United Airline's 142 Boeing 727s and PAA's 110 Boeing 707s. The difference 
in productivity due to this fact alone is inunediately apparent. With more 
aircraft of the same type, labour-saving maintenance equipment can be used 
and better arrangements made for the stocking of spares etc. 
51. The fact that the creation of homogeneous fleets is amenable to poli-
tical influence is of special significance for this report. 
52. The general conclusion that may be drawn from the foregoing comparison 
between Europe and the u.s.A. - even if individual figures are disputed -
is that the cost-effectiveness of the European airlines could be substantial-
ly improved by Community action in the following fields: 
- improvement of the route network and flight schedules by the multilateral 
negotiation of landing rights; 
- creation of homogeneous fleets through cooperation in development, procure-
ment and maintenance, and possibly by merging the departments with respon-
sibility in those areas. 
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Chapter III - Air safety 
A) Accidents 
53. Aviation accidents are still a regular 1occurrence; their spectacular 
and tragic aspects are heightened by the increasingly greater loss of life 
aboard larger aircraft, whereas the appalling figures for road traffic 
accidents, for example, are not published until the end of the year. 
54. In reality, airlines do not compare at all badly with many forms of 
surface transport. 
55. At all events it cannot be said that scheduled air. transport has become 
more dangerous, as the following figures for the last ten years will show, 
even if the sharply declining trend from 1960 to 1965 was broken by the high 
accident rate in 1966. As air traffic density increases, flight safety 
will continue to pose new problems. 
1 
World Aviation Safety Statistics1 
Passenger fatalities Passenger fatalities per 
Year (number) 100 milliotl passenger 
kilometres 
1960 873 0.00 
1961 805 0.69 
1962 778 0.60 
1963 715 0.49 
1964 616 0.36 
1965 684 0.35 
1966 1,001 0.44 
1967 678 0.25 
1968 912 0.29 
1969 946 0.27 
1970 680 0.18 
1971 859 0.22 
The figures are for schedule services provided by the airlines of ICAO 
member countries in the years 1960 - 1971 (non-member States: USSR and 
China). 
Source: ICAO: "Annual report of the council to the Assembly for 1971". 
56. Air traffic safety depends on a great many factors·for which the air-
craft industry, the airlines and the airport administrations, are chiefly 
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responsible. 
It should not be forgotten, however, that in many cases, the further 
development of European cooperation in a large number of specific sectors 
could help substantially to improve the situation. 
Airport authorities must be expected to proceed with airport develop-
ment in accordance with the most up-to-date standards. Greater safety must 
be the constant aim of the aircraft industry and the airlines. 
57. One of the most important objectives of European air transport policy 
must be to establish a uniform air traffic control system in the upper and 
lower airspace1 So far, Eurocontrol has not succeeded in doing so. 
Cooperation between air traffic control units in the various countries 
is still not satisfactory. Although it fortunately cannot be said that 
accidents are more frequent, there is an alarming increase in the number of 
air-misses. 
58. The division between civil and military control is still a major source 
of danger in several Member States. 
Italy is the only country with a uniform air traffic control system, all 
services being under the authority of the military. According to the latest 
planning the Federal Republic of Germany is to take the opposite course, with 
military ATC units due to be disbanded and air traffic control made the 
responsibility of a civil body, the 'Bundesanstalt fUr Flugsicherung'. by 
the end of 1973. 
If all countrieswere to follow either the Italian or German example, 
one of the major sources of danger would be removed. 
59. A common approach to air traffic safety should be worked out as part of 
a common air transport policy. 
B) Air piracy and sabotage 
60. Over the last few years acts of piracy and sabotage against defenceless 
civil aircraft have unfortunately become a fairly common occurrence. Motives 
are extremely varied, ranging from the furtherance of more or less credible 
political causes through ransom demands to compulsive acts of the mentally 
unbalanced. 
1 The boundary between upper and lower airspace lies at 6,000 m or 7,000 m 
depending on the country. 
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61. Every hijacker or saboteur is unfortunately assured of world-wide 
publicity and this in itself is sufficient motive for many of them. It 
might help in the long run if the mass media were to exercise some restraint 
in reporting such cases# but it is even more important that governments 
should agree to introduce a common policy for the sentencing and extradition 
of hijackers and saboteurs. 
62. A promising start has been made in this direction. In 1963 an agree-
ment was concluded in Tokyo on the punishment of crimes committed on board 
aircraft. The agreement stipulates that the country in which the aircraft 
is registered has the right to try crimes committed on board. Aircraft 
captains are authorised to take preemptive measures against unlawful acts on 
board and to force offenders to leave at the next airport. In the event of 
hijacking, the signatory states are required to take all necessary measures 
to restore command of the aircraft to the flight captain. Since the Tokyo 
agreement did not seem to go far enough, particularly where hijacking was 
concerned, a further agreement dealing specifically with the prevention of 
hijacking, was concluded at the Hague in 1970. It provides for the resump-
tion of command by the flight captain, assistance to passengers and crews of 
hijacked aircraft to continue their journey and the arrest and punishment or 
extradition of the hijacker(s). The signatory states undertake to make 
hijacking a criminal offence carrying a heavy penalty. 
In September 1971 a third agreement was concluded in Montreal to combat 
all other crimes against civil aviation except hijacking. Heavy penalties 
are stipulated in cases of attempts on the life of persons on board airborne 
aircraft and of sabotage and bomb incidents which damage aircraft or threaten 
flight safety. 
63. All three agreements were concluded under the aegis of ICAO and hence 
the United Nations. So far unfortunately, there have been all too few 
ratifications and even signatures. 
64. Faced with this situation, the International Air Transport Association 
and the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA) 
made an approach to the United Nations. Matters came to a head on 20 July 
1972 when pilot action seriously curtailed air traffic throughout the world. 
Despite this, the UN Security Council, meeting on 21 June 1972, merely 
issued what was a weak call for measures to combat acts of violence committed 
against civil aviation. 
It is greatly to be regretted that the Member States of the European 
Community have not yet advanced very far with the procedure for signature 
and ratification of the air safety agreements, as the following table shows: 
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Member States 
Belgium 
Germany 
France 
Italy 1 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Members: 
Denmark 
Ireland 
United 
Kingdom 
Situation as aL April 1972 with regard to the 
signature and ratification of the Air Safety 
Agreements 
Tokyo Agreement The Hague Agreement Montreal Agreement 
(1963) (1970) (1971) 
signed ratified signed ratified signed ratified 
Yes Yes Yes - Yes -
Yes Yes Yes - Yes -
Yes Yes Yes - - -
Yes Yes Yes - Yes -
2 Yes Yes 
- - - -
Yes Yes Yes - Yes -
Yes Yes Yes - - -
Yes - - - - -
Yes Yes Yes fes Yes 
-
Source: 'Air Line Pilot' April 1972. 
1Italy recently voted a bill on air safety but ratification of the 
International Agreement is still necessary. 
2 Luxembourg ratified in July 1972. 
65. Owing to an insufficient number of signatory states, the Montreal 
Agreement has not yet taken effect but the Tokyo and Hague agreements came 
into force in 1969 and 1971 respectively. 
It should also be noted that many overseas countries have still not 
signed any of them. 
66. Unfortunately, none of these agreements can be expected to produce an 
incisive deterrent effect on hijackers and other criminals until all the 
cour.tries of the world, through ratification or at least signature, have 
made it clear to them that they will not be granted asylum or will, at any 
rate, face heavy penalties. Speedy ratification of the Hague and Montreal 
Agreements by a joint decision of the Community Member States might never-
theless make a considerable impression on potential wrongdoers. 
The Community should develop a common approach to the problem along 
these linear when negotiating trade and transport arrangements with inter-
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) 
ested third countries, especially after the enlargement, it could bring 
some pressure to bear on them to accede to the air safety agreements. 
C) Environmental protection 
67. In most countries of the Community, discussion of how air transport 
can be fitted into an environmental protection strategy is still at a very 
early stage. 
Pollution and noise in the vicinity of many airports have clearly 
reached a point where legislation is required. Furthermore, if and when 
air transport enters the supersonic era, the sonic boom will probably be 
heard not only near airports but in all areas overflown. 
68. The airlines for their part have already begun to tackle the problems. 
Answers to them may be found in aircraft construction, flight scheduling 
and in the selection of air routes. 
69. There has been no indication so far of a generally recognised solution, 
either in public opinion or in responsible circles. 
It would thus be all the more desirable for the Member States of the 
community to seek a common approach in this matter, which they could then 
uphold against third countries. This would at least be simpler than having 
each Member State frame separate regulations that would have to be care-
fully harmonized at a later stage. 
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Chapter IV - Towards a connnon air transport policy 
70. owing to their urgency and importance, the previous chapter was devoted 
entirely to questions of safety. We now come to the other areas in which a 
connnon air transport policy seems necessary and might well produce benefi-
cial effects. 
A) Landing rights and flight scheduling· 
71. It is fairly widely acknowledged that the flight scheduling system in 
Europe, both for domestic and intra-Conununity operations and for services 
with European non-member and overseas countries, leaves something to be 
desired. It frequently happens that several flights by different airlines 
leave airports at almost the same times bound for the same destination while 
at other times of the day there are no departures at all; flights within 
Europe are too often scheduled to link up with trans-Atlantic services and 
cannot therefore be considered as an optimum response to intra-European 
requirements; there is often too much competition on some routes while 
others are not operated at all. 
72. Closer cooperation between the airlines is not the answer in this case 
since they already cooperate to the fullest desirable extent in the IATA 
Scheduling Conunittee. The crux of the matter is that airlines cannot plan 
their routes on the sole basis of traffic requirements but must work from 
the premises dictated by bilateral negotiations on landing rights. 
It was pointed out in Chapter II, Section C (a comparison with the USA) 
that one of the obvious reasons for the lower cost-effectiveness of the 
European airlines is that they are obliged to operate on irrational star-
shaped networks whereas in the United States, where there are far more 
circular routes with more frequent stopovers, the return on capital and 
labour is higher. 
73. For this reason the question of flight scheduling must be viewed and 
dealt with in conjunction with that of landing rights. At present, landing 
rights are first negotiated and the airlines must then make the best of the 
conditions imposed on them; in future, a flight scheduling system should 
first be established in outline (with, of course, substantial assistance 
from the airlines) and individual airline allocations then made. 
74. This means that the Connnunity Member States would switch from the 
system of bilateral negotiations on landing rights to negotiations on a 
multilateral basis or at Connnunity level. 
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In thc3e negotiations the competent authorities in the Member States 
together with the airlines' flight scheduling experts could perhaps establish 
a rational basic system of flight scheduling with the assistance of IATA 
experts. 
Working by this rather than the present method of individual planning, 
it would be far easier to use electronic computers: BOAC is apparently the 
only airline to do so as yet. 
The result would be a route network with many more circular routes than 
star-shaped patterns. 
In establishing this flight scheduling system, the Member States could 
inunediately make known any regional policy measures they wished to introduce. 
But if they put forward proposals based on regional policy considerations 
that were not economic propositions, immediate provision would have to be 
made under the system for offset payn1ents to the airlines. It does seem, 
however, that if they could be introduced under appropriate landing rights 
agreements a good many air routes, particularly those linking regions across 
national frontiers, might well prove entirely economic. During the second 
stage, the scheduled routes and flights would have to be allocated to the 
various airlines: this in itself would be a more rational solution to the 
quota problem which partly caused the failure of the Air Union project. 
This solution might also become one of the features of a common policy 
on the use of available capacity in air transport. 
75. Common action or, in other words, the creation of a common European 
airspace would bring with it the added advantage that the Member States of 
the community would be able to negotiate jointly with third countries from 
a much improved bargaining position. 
76. At the present time overseas airlines are much better placed to operate 
to and from Europe than the European airlines themselves: when, for example, 
ten European airlines are each authorized to land in New York, each of the 
three American airlines may be allowed in return to make three or four 
landings in various European capitals. 
77. On the whole it is difficult to see how the present European air trans-
port situation can be improved without common action to negotiate landing 
rights on a multilateral basis. 
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B) Harmonization of legal provisions 
78. Just as no progress is possible in flight scheduling without common 
action, so technical, operational and commercial cooperation between the 
airlines (on which a few comments are offered below) cannot make much 
further headway without Community efforts to harmonize certain legal 
provisions concerning air transport. 
79. Briefly, the present position is that the airlines have virtually 
reached the limits of what can be done under the legislation of the 
various Member States. They argue that a far-reaching step towards closer 
cooperation could be taken if the barriers created by legal provisions were 
removed. Very often those barriers reside simply in the differences between 
regulations applicable in the various countries. The problem was clearly 
recognized during negotiations on the Air Union project which is why Article 
lb of the draft agreement (last version dated 19 and 20 May 1965) provided 
for the harmonization of legal provisions on air transport. 
BO. The individual regulations are too numerous to be listed here but the 
most important of them relate to airworthiness certificates, the licencing 
and registration of aircraft, the leasing of aircraft, pilots' examinations 
and a wide variety of operational instructions. 
81. Especially after enlargement, the Community could set a trend in this 
field reaching beyond its own frontiers and the immediate objective of 
cooperation between the European airlines. 
Be that as it may, the difficulties involved in this task of harmoniza-
tion should not be underestimated. 
C) Technical and operational cooperation between the airlines 
82. Provided that progress is made in harmonizing legal provisions as 
called for above, technical cooperation between the airlines may be 
expected to improve, even without the Air Union. 
83. In the last four years, three technical cooperation agreements have 
been concluded - KUSS, ATLAS and the Montparnasse Committee (after the 
initials of the participating airlines or the place where the agreements 
were concluded). 
Under the KUSS agreement, KLM, UTA, Swissair and SAS cooperate in the 
procurement and maintenance of various aircraft types; they have jointly 
purchased a flight simulator for the Boeing 747 and also cooperate on the 
maintenance and overhaul of this aircraft. 
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The main purpose of the ATLAS agreement concluded in 1968 between 
Alitalia, Lufthansa, Air France and Sabena, later joined by Iberia, is the 
maintenance of the Boeing 747: Air France checks the airframes, Lufthansa 
the power units, Alitalia and Sabena major items of equipment while Iberia 
provides assistance with the common flight simulator for pilot training. 
The Montparnasse Committee consists of the KUSS and ATLAS members plus 
BOAC, Aer Lingus and El Al. They coordinate their long-·term equipment 
policies and propose to act jointly in the introduction of SST equipment. 
84. Although the membership of those groups should ideally be identical 
with that of the Community as was the case with the Air Union project, the 
airlines of the enlarged Community nevertheless form a nucleus for coopera-
tion and there is no reasons to argue that the Community as such should not 
sponsor the groups {although the fact that only one of its three member 
countries is joining the Community may cause some difficulty for SAS). 
D) Cooperation between the Member States in research, development and 
industry 
85. Aircraft construction is one of the 'advanced technology industries' 
which will be given special consideration under the Commission's proposals 
on industrial and research policy1• The European industries have already 
made a promising start to cooperation in this field {Concorde, A 300 B 
Airbus, Fellowship, Mercury and VFW-614, to mention only civil projects) 
so that in any joint action the community will not have to start from the 
beginning. 
86. Details on the promotion of industrial research and development would 
be superfluous in a report on air transport policy. The European Parliament 
will be required to give full consideration to this matter on another 
occasion. 
However, the Commission's thinking on the subject may be sununarized as 
follows: 
- The Community should promote cooperation between and perhaps even a 
merger of the European aircraft industries. 
- A committee should be set up at Community level to coordinate Member 
States' planning in aviation. 
1 See the 'Communication from the Commission to the Council on the 
industrial and technological policy measures required in the aircraft 
industry' Doc. COM (72) 850, 12 July 1972. 
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- Financial support for the aircraft industry should be decided at 
community-level: in particular the Community could let joint research 
and development contracts and provide financial guarantees etc. 
- Community estimates could be made of airline requirements for various 
types of aircraft. 
The Community .could remove some of the obstacles to the sale of air-
craft manufactured in the Member States by scrutinizing the customs 
regulations of various countries, harmonizing technical norms and 
introducing standard airworthiness certificates and aircraft licencing 
regulations. 
- The Member States of the Community could arrange for joint administration 
of landing rights and establish a common European route network and 
flight scheduling system, thus allowing more realistic advance planning 
of future aircraft requirements. 
- The Statistical Office of the Communities could pursue its efforts to 
obtain consistent and more detailed air traffic statistics. 
Many of the above industrial policy proposals fortunately coincide 
with the transport-policy orientated criteria set out in this report. 
A final point in this connection is that radical improvement in the 
cost-effectiveness of air transport in Europe will depend among other 
things on whether aircraft can be built that are ideally suited to 
European (and not extra-European) conditions. 
E) Comrnercial cooperation between airlines 
87. Numerous commercial cooperation agreements, generally in the form of 
pooling arrangements have been concluded between the airlines of the Member 
States. Under these arrangements, the airlines share their landing rights 
on a specific route offering a flight schedule that is rationalized to the 
fullest possible extent: receipts are distributed in accordance with a 
fixed formula which is unaffected by the number of passengers carried by 
the aircraft of the individual airlines. Those pooling and similar 
arrangements are too numerous to list here, besides which most of them are 
secret. 
The pooling arrangements may be described as a sort of Air Union for 
individual routes between individual airlines or, put in another way, the 
Air Union would have been an extension of the pooling system to all of the 
routes on which the six Comrnunity airlines operate. 
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88. The Community could do much to mprove and extend pooling arrangements 
by harmonizing Member States' legislation in the matter of commercial 
cooperation between airlines. Under a multilateral landing rights policy 
certain routes in the European flight scheduling system could immediately 
be assigned to individual pools. 
F) Simplification of border formalities 
89. One of the causes for the much lower cost-effectiveness of European as 
compared with American air transport undoubtedly lies in the customs and 
passport formalities to which passengers are subject at airports almost 
everywhere. This factor was not mentioned in section C of Chapter II since 
it unfortunately cannot be quantified. But even if no figures can be pro-
vided, its cost to the European airlines in terms of staff requirements, 
loss of time and susceptibility to organizational error must certainly be 
considerable. 
Acting jointly, the Member States should make greater efforts to 
remove customs and tax barriers and to abolish or relax passport controls. 
Although real progress has been made in this field in the last few years a 
great deal remains to be done. Unfortunately but inevitably, air piracy and 
other attempts on aircraft seem to be producing an opposite trend. Luggage 
and passenger searches for weapons and bombs certainly do not make formali-
ties any easier but this of course applies equally to American air transport. 
90. In addition to further easing of customs and passport controls, special 
importance must be attached to energetic measures to improve air traffic 
safety as called for above. 
G) Rates and fares 
91. As far as rates and fares are concerned, air transport has reached a 
crossroad where major decisions must be taken for the future. Should a 
cheaper fares policy be adopted with the risk that deficits originally 
accepted as a temporaiy necessity might become a permanent feature? 
No decision has so far been taken in the matter. The position of the 
airlines and tariff policy authorities is reflected in the increasing 
number and variety of special rates now on offer. The result is that as 
in the case of the railways with their experimental fares, the average 
traveller no longer has a clear picture of the reductions to which he may 
be entitled (these depend on his age and occupation, the time and duration 
of the journey etc.). 
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92. International air fares are of course negotiated by IATA on government 
instructions at tariff conferences and must subsequently be approved by the 
competent authorities in the States concerned. 
93. As the Commission has·suggested, the Community might consider whether 
and how the situation could be improved through joint action and the require-
ments of the Common Market taken into account~ 
H) common rules for charter transport 
94. As mentioned in Chapter II, Section B, one of the most striking trends 
in air transport at the present time is the boom in charter traffic. The 
airlines see this as a threat to their existence or at least to their earning 
capacity. 
95. New rules for charter transport therefore seem necessary if regular 
scheduled services are to be maintained. In particular the Member States 
of the Community should agree on a new definition of charter traffic and 
subsequently on a common licencing policy. 
96. The committee wishes, however, to stress that there is no reason to go 
too far by interfering unduly with charter traffic which should not be 
inhibited in the special role it has to play in world air transport. 
97. Joint action in this field must therefore be taken under a common 
transport plan in which charter traffic should be taken into account and 
restricted only to the extent absolutely necessary to maintain scheduled 
services. 
I) Infrastructure (airports and air traffic control) 
98. As already pointed out, the common air transport policy must logically 
be made part and parcel of the common policy for the other modes of trans-
port. 
The Community infrastructure principle that is to be applied to other 
means of transport should also hold good for air transport viz that the 
individual sectors should bear their own infrastructure costs in full, 
passing them on to the customer in accordance with an equitable formula. 
99. Joint action in this field must therefore cover airport charges and 
air traffic control costs. Subsidies, including indirect subsidies, should 
be abolished, discrimination prevented and support given to ICAO's world-
wide efforts in this direction. 
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100. The following two points are of European interest with regard to the 
joint planning of a European infrastructural network, which is still 
unfortunately only at the consultative stage: 
(i) All major airports need fast direct links with city centres by rail 
and urban motorway, otherwise time gained by flying is lost in travel 
to and from the airport. 
(ii) A study should be made, within the framework of European regional 
policy, of how conununications between certain regions and the major 
European economic centres could be improved by developing some of 
the smaller airports. 
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Chapter V - The Conunission's proposals 
101. As indicated in Section 11 of this report, the Conunission submitted to 
the Council on 21 June 1972 a 'Draft Council (EEC) decision on initial steps 
towards conunon action in the sphere of air transport' (Doc. COM (72) 695). 
102. In its preamble to that proposal the Conunission invoked the EEC Treaty 
as a whole and made special reference to Article 84(2) only. There are 
nevertheless grounds for considering that the proposal is in fact based on 
Article 235, under the terms of which the European Parliament must be con-
sulted. (See Section 1 of this report for the full text of Article 235). 
In his communication of 27 September 1972, referring the Conunission' s 
proposal to the European Parliament for its opinion, the President of the 
Council expressly recognized that the Conunission had submitted its draft 
'in the form laid down for a proposal'. Since the Commission has no right 
of proposal under Article 84(2), the Council too seems to be assuming that 
the proposal has been made under Article 235. 
103. As is clearly shown by the quotations in section 10 above from its 
general reports, the Conunission originally intended to present the Council 
with a comprehensive proposal for the development of a conunon air transport 
policy. 
However, it abandoned this idea - probably because, despite the expert 
reports prepared at its instigation it would not have been able to prepare 
a comprehensive proposal without considerable extra staff competent in air. 
transport matters. In any event, the CoitL~ission now seems more determined 
than ever to put the Counci±'s political will to the test. Its representa-
tive informed your conunittee that the main purpose of the proposal was to 
open the door to implementation of Article 84(2). The proposal is accordingly 
of procedural rather than practical importance. 
104. Your committee would have preferred a detailed practical proposal for 
the sake of more rapid progress, but in the circumstances it accepts the 
Commission's procedural considerations as justified and raises no objectic,ns. 
105. The Conunission's proposal is extremely concise: an explanatory statement 
of nine points only and a proposed decision consisting of an extremely short 
prP.amble and recitals, followed by only two articles. Let us examine this 
proposal in detail. 
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A) Explanatory statement 
Point 1 
106. The Commission begins by recapitulating its own and Parliament's 
hitherto unsuccessful efforts to bring the Council to implement Article 
84(2). A somewhat fuller account will be found in Chapter I, B) and C) 
of this report. 
Point 2 
107. The Commission then refers to the attempts at European cooperation on 
air transport outside the framework of the Community. This aspect is also 
dealt with in Chapter I, D) and E) of this report. 
Point 3 
108. Your committee agrees with the Commission that a fresh attempt at a 
common air transport policy is opportune in view of the new situation 
created by the technical and economic changes of recent years and the 
enlargement of the Community. 
It also agrees that the Commission should base the common approach on: 
(i) allocation of landing rights at Community level; 
(ii) structural policy with respect to airlines; 
(iii) organization of a European airline network; 
(iv) technical cooperation between airlines. 
Your committee also agrees that preparation of the basis for further 
integration and a clear definition of medium- and long-term objectives are 
in themselves a step forward. 
It does not share the Commission's view that these objectives obviously 
cannot be reached in the near future. From the purely practical point of 
view, they could, for example, be rapidly achieved through the establishment 
of the Air Union. All that has been lacking so far is the political will 
to accept the attendant loss of sovereignty. This may have been partly 
due to a failure to make the necessary distinction between considerations 
of transport and defence. 
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Point 4 
109. The Commission deals rather briefly with the Community's possible 
long-term air transport objectives, which it conceives in terms of two 
phases. 
Phase one would entail closer cooperation between Member States and 
airlines within the institutional framework of the Comrnunity through the 
coordination of procedures:fbr consultation and concerted action. This 
would be accompanied by harmonization of legal and administrative air 
transport-provisions which hinder such cooperation. 
Furthermore, cooperation would be a step-by-step process pursued 
simultaneously at government and airline level. 
Phase two would be marked by the introduction of a real comrnon air 
transport policy. While welcoming the Commission's statement of this 
objective at such an early stage, your committee regrets that the objectiv~ 
is neither described in detail nor mentioned in the proposed decision. 
110. The commission rejects in advance the contention that the world-wide 
ramifications of air transport make the Community too narrow a field of 
action. Your committee supports the Commission in this view. It shares 
the opinion that Europe has specific air transport problems of its own to 
which European solutions can be found. 
111. Your committee regrets the weakness of the Commission's assertion 
that a joint study of the problems of cooperation with third countries 
and in international organizations 'could be of interest in certain 
respects'. It should have made the point that the whole idea of a common 
air transport policy and of the EEC Treaty itself is that Member States 
should proceed jointly in such matters. (See Article 116 of the EEC Treaty) 
Point 5 
112. The Commission does not propose that all the necessary measures laid 
down for the initial phase described in Point 4 should be implemented 
simultaneously. In Point 5 it gives a list of priorities which form the 
basis of Article 1 of the proposed decision. The list contains two items 
only: 
(i) improvement of air transport services among the countries of the 
Community and between those countries and third countries; 
(ii) ratemaking policy. 
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113. Your conunittee regrets that the list does not include safety matters 
and the harmonization of legal provisions. It also doubts whether rate-
making policy can be tackled as the very first priority in a step-by-step 
process. 
Point 6 
114. Points 6 to 8 deal in more detail with the Conunission's reasons for 
wishing to establish priorities for the matters referred to in Point 5. 
115. By 'improvement of the air transport network within the Conununity' the 
Conunission means: 
(i) replacement of bilateral negotiations on landing rights by negotiations 
at Conununity level; 
(ii) development of an overall conception of the air traffic network, with 
due regard for the requirements of regional policy; 
(iii) necessary technical and commercial cooperation between airlines, 
especially in standardizing aircraft types. 
Your committee supports the Commission's proposals on these matters. 
Point 7 
116. Your conunittee is disappointed with the weak assertion that 'it would 
be rather unrealistic to suppose that •••• IATA can be superseded'. On the 
contrary, it is essential that all plans adopted at Comm.unity level should 
make use of IATA, an instrument which has been in existence for almost 
thirty years. However, the Conununity should endeavour to ensure that its 
airlines regularly adopt joint positions within IATA. The Member States of 
the conununity should likewise coordinate their attitudes to the approval of 
rates proposed by IATA. 
117. As mentioned in Point 113, your conunittee doubts whether there is any 
urgent need to fix guidelines for ratemaking policy and eliminate tariff 
discrepancies on specific routes, except as regards agreement on a conunon 
procedure for the approval of proposed rates. Rigid guidelines may not be 
possible until Member States have harmonized legal provisions which influence 
costs. 
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Point 8 
118. Your committee regrets that the Commission's proposal makes so great a 
distinction of a purely formal nature between possible common action with 
regard to the intra-Community air network and that concerning air connections 
with third countries; at the end of Point 6 of its explanatory statement the 
Commission itself mentions the close connection between the two, while rate-
making policy concerns intra-Community traffic and traffic with third 
countries alike. 
119. By 'development of air transport connections between the Community and 
third countries' the Commission means: 
(i) support for a coordinated plan for long-haul transport; 
(ii) a coordinated policy for the exchange of landing rights with third 
countries; 
(iii) concerted action on the revision of provisions governing charter flights. 
120. Your committee agrees with these objectives. 
Point 9 
121. Here we see the Commission's immediate purpose in proposing this 
decision: it wishes the Council to recognize its right to 'examine' air 
transport problems with representatives of Member States and of the air-
lines and to draw up a report. 
In fact the Commission already has this right, but under Article 235, 
not Article 84(2). Clearly Member States have not yet been prepared to 
appoint representatives for such discussions. In proposing this decision 
the Commission hopes to persuade the Council to bring about the change of 
attitude which it considers opportune. 
The proposal does not provide for the establishment of a committee, 
but only for a rather informal ad hoe working party. 
122. While Point 9 of the explanatory statement refers to experts from 
Member States and to representatives of the airlines, Article 1(1) mentions 
experts fr01n Member States only. 
In your committee's view, the participation of at least one government 
representative and at least one airline representative from each Member 
State should be ensured at the outset. 
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B) Draft decision 
Preamble 
123. Your conunittee would welcome a reference to Article 235 as well as to 
Article 84(2) in the preamble, since Article 235 makes consultation of 
Parliament mandatory and gives the Commission the right to submit proposals. 
Recitals 
124. Your conunittee would welcome a reference in the recitals to the need 
for a conunon air transport policy. 
Article 1 
125. Your committee considers that this article should specify that Member 
States shall appoint both a representative of the authorities and a repre-
sentative of the airlines. 
126. Your conunittee considers that, in the statement of objectives for 
Conununity action, the improvement of the intra-Community transport network 
and that of connections with third countries should come under one heading. 
It also considers that safety problems (flight safety, anti-hijacking 
measures and environmental protection) are urgent enough to warrant special 
mention, and that reference should be made to the need for harmonization of 
Member States' legal provisions on air transport, despite the fact that the 
Conunission apparently considers such harmonization part of the 'improvement 
of air traffic connections' and, as such, already covered by the decision. 
Article 2 
127. No conunent. 
128. Your committee has included proposed modifications to the Commission's 
proposal in its motion for a resolution on the basis of the foregoing obser-
vations. 
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